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WHOSE PRIVACY?*
Clemens P. Work**
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, [but] is the
skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.'
Oliver Wendell Holmes may not have had privacy in mind
when he wrote one of the most beautiful passages in American ju-
risprudence, but his sentiments about context would be endorsed
by the American press. Privacy is clearly a relative concept. The
press favors more privacy when its own free-flow-of-information
interests are at stake, but favors less privacy (more openness)
when the privacy or reputation interests of citizens are at stake,
when seeking information from government, or even when the
news media's own pocketbook interests are at stake. At a time
when public concern about privacy, and about the news media's
incursions into privacy, seems to be growing, or at least reaching a
cyclical high-water mark, it is time to take a closer look at the
news media's complex relationship with privacy.
There are plenty of examples of the news media's seemingly
inconsistent, ambivalent-or even hypocritical-attitude toward
privacy, and I will discuss some of them. However, it is not merely
a matter of whose ox is being gored. For one thing, accusations of
news media invasions of privacy ignore or diminish the historically
robust role of the American press. Concern for individual privacy
has never been the news media's most sacrosanct value. Plenty of
support exists also, in modern American jurisprudence, for the
news media's insistence that the free flow of information should
usually prevail over notions of individual privacy. Much of the
news media's inconsistency, and much of the public's attitude
about press invasions of privacy, seems to stem from the fact that
privacy is such a broad and amorphous concept. Privacy breeds
* This article is adapted from a speech given at the University of Montana Law School
on April 29, 1993, during a University of Montana-Toyo University symposium on American
and Japanese press freedoms.
** Associate Professor, University of Montana School of Journalism. Professor Work is
an attorney and was a senior editor of U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT from 1982 to 1990.
Professor Work was the assistant director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, in Washington, D.C., from 1980-1982. He worked as a reporter for the NATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL and the ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS. Professor Work received a bachelor's degree in
political science from Stanford University and a juris doctor degree from Golden Gate Uni-
versity School of Law.
1. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.).
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confusion among journalists, citizens and jurists alike.
To be sure, the erosion of privacy is a legitimate and signifi-
cant concern to Americans, and the news media do, not infre-
quently, step on toes and over lines. Today, people-voters, read-
ers, viewers, citizens-are upset and confused over their eroding
privacy. In a 1991 survey of citizens by Louis Harris & Associates,
seventy-nine percent of respondents expressed concern about per-
sonal privacy, up from sixty-four percent in 1978.2 Recent polls
and studies, which show declining trust in the media, often cite the
perception that privacy is invaded far too often as one of the rea-
sons. In a nationwide telephone poll conducted by the Los Angeles
Times in March 1993, two of the five most frequently mentioned
complaints against the news media were that they are too sensa-
tional (twenty-eight percent) and that they are rude, intrusive and
violate people's privacy (eleven percent). Other complaints cen-
tered on bias (twenty-two percent), inaccuracy (fifteen percent),
and news media negativity (ten percent). In the same poll, sixty-
three percent of respondents agreed with the statement that the
news media "reveal too much about the private lives of public
figures," while fifty-eight percent thought that "[m]ost newspaper
reporters are just concerned about getting a good story, and they
don't worry very much about hurting people."3
Readers' complaints to ombudsmen show a whole range of new
issues bugging them, besides the perennial complaints such as lack
of balance.4 Charles Bailey, former editor of the Minneapolis Trib-
une, reported that "[r]eaders of both sexes are readier to object to
journalistic invasion of privacy-and quicker to complain when
they think their newspaper is wallowing in sleaze." 5 When four
California newspapers and others in the country printed the names
of the jurors in the first Rodney King trial (and one radio station
even broadcast their phone numbers) the day after their explosive
verdict was announced, the public outcry was loud and
immediate.'
We seem to be in an era of changing public sensibilities and
greater sensitivity or testiness, and the news media are often the
target of complaints. One small-town newspaper editor tallied six
times as many complaints from 1985 to 1990 than in the previous
2. Lori Ringhand, Backlash, QUILL, Oct. 1992, at 10.
3. David Shaw, Trust in Media is on Decline, Los ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 31, 1993, at
Al, A16-A17.
4. Charles W. Bailey, Women, Privacy and Sleaze, NIEMAN REP., Summer 1992, at 63.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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five years. Many readers reacted to such seemingly innocuous
items as public employees' salaries and details about the lives of
political candidates, as well as the names of juveniles convicted of
felonies, and photos and accounts of crime. 7 Editors from big-city
newspapers noticed the same phenomenon, reporting increased
complaints not only about graphic photos of violence and accident
scenes, but also about bankruptcy notices, home sales, causes of
death and even divorce and marriage notices.8 "Privacy has a vis-
ceral appeal for the average person," observed Jane Kirtley, execu-
tive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.
She noted further, "After all, if the news media, or the public, can
gain access to records about me, that information could end up on
the evening news, or the front page."9
All hell broke loose when Geneva Overholser, editor of the Des
Moines Register, wanted to ask rape victims if they wanted their
names published. This followed on the heels of a now-famous and
publicly acclaimed series of stories about a rape victim, Nancy
Ziegenmeyer, who had agreed to be named.1° But when the Regis-
ter merely wanted to see the names of other rape victims on inci-
dent reports, in order to ask them if they wanted to go public,"
they found the names blocked out in violation of the state's open
records law.'2 A TV station erroneously reported that the Register
wanted to force the names of rape victims to be published; thus, it
was no surprise at all when a poll conducted by the same station
showed 2,700 people in favor of police closing rape victims' records
and 100 people voting for free access by the media.13
When a tabloid television program was given permission to in-
terview serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer in prison, a Wisconsin state
senator protested that the privacy of the victims' families was be-
ing invaded. He said:
There is no First Amendment issue here. We are protecting soci-
ety and internal security when we stop these interviews. We are
protecting children who might watch such a program, and sick
7. Mitchell Hartman, Press and Public Collide as Concern Over Privacy Rises,
QUILL, Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 3-4.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Jane Kirtley, Views from the Top, speech at Montana FOI Conference, (May 15,
1993), in MONTANA FOI HOTLINE NEWSFLASH, Summer 1993, at 3.
10. Jane Schorer, It Couldn't Happen to Me: One Woman's Story, DES MOINES REG.,
Feb. 25-Mar. 1, 1990, at IA.
11. Telephone Interview with Geneva Overholser, editor of The Des Moines Register
(Nov. 23, 1993).
12. IOWA CODE § 22.1 to .12 (West Supp. 1989 & 1993).
13. Hartman, supra note 7, at 5.
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people who might copy Dahmer. I'd shut down all interviews. The
news media have a monetary interest in these interviews to sell
papers and advertising."'
Public concern about the news media seems to have been
heightened by publication of details of public figures' private lives.
The last decade has seen a veritable orgy, some would say, of "in-
fotainment" gossip-mongering, with newspapers and magazines,
print and electronic, scooping and tripping over one another to re-
veal the very latest peccadilloes of public figures. A short list would
include:
* Presidential wannabe Gary Hart, without whom Donna Rice
would not even be in a dog food commercial and Monkey Business
would be . . .well . . .just another boat.
- Former Virginia governor Chuck Robb, without whom Tai Collins
would be just another Donna Rice.
- William Kennedy Smith, accused of rape by Palm Beach habitue
Patricia Bowman, whose name and unremarkable lifestyle were
painstakingly chronicled by the New York Times.
* Tennis legend Arthur Ashe, who launched a forecourt offense to
forestall a possible USA Today story on his AIDS infection.
- Presidential candidate Bill Clinton, whose alleged sexual adven-
tures with Gennifer Flowers made him, as one journalist put it,
"the latest to be trampled in the rush to the Sea of Sleaze." 6
- Sen. Bob Packwood (R-Ore.), whose diaries, in the finest tradi-
tion of Samuel Pepys, have captivated just as much attention to-
day as Pepys' observation did in his day.
From the news media's perspective, public concern about pri-
vacy has led to a backlash. For example, privacy concerns are being
used to justify legislation that would close off public access to his-
torically open information such as municipal utility records, licens-
ing data, and Department of Motor Vehicle records.16 Although
Congress found it difficult to pass a handgun control bill mandat-
ing a 5-day waiting period, 17 the Illinois legislature had no trouble
approving a 10-day waiting period for release of driving records. 8
Victims' rights legislation introduced in several states would
seal off traditionally open information to protect victims in cases
14. Kirtley, supra note 9.
15. Todd Gitlin, Media Lemmings Run Amok!, WASH. JOURNALISM REV., Apr. 1, 1992,
at 28, 28.
16. Ringhand, supra note 2, at 11.
17. The Brady bill was finally signed into law by President Clinton on November 29,
1993.
18. Ringhand, supra note 2, at 12.
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of racial or sexual assault. Alaska's Victim's Right Law bars the
release of telephone numbers and addresses of witnesses in open
court unless the court determines that the information is
relevant.19
In Montana, despite one of the strongest and most explicit
Right to Know provisions in any state constitution, 0 University of
Montana journalism Professor Bob McGiffert has documented
close to 100 privacy exceptions.21
In 1991, Montana trial lawyers pushed through a law sealing
all information in criminal affidavits before trial.22 The law was so
blatantly unconstitutional that then-Attorney General Marc
Racicot refused to defend it,25 and the Montana Supreme Court
agreed with his judgment. 4
Some courts are testing new theories for holding the press lia-
ble for personal harms. Opinions such as Florida Star v. B.J.F."
and Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn2" have affirmed the ability of
the press to publish without penalty truthful private information
obtained from government officials, in spite of confidentiality laws,
or from files ordered sealed. To hold the news media liable despite
such holdings, some courts are entertaining liability claims under
such laws as Sections 198327 and 1985(3)28 of the Civil Rights Act.
For example, in Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc.,29 a newspaper pub-
lished details from a leaked confidential police report on a com-
19. Ringhand, supra note 2, at 12.
20. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9.
21. Interview with Robert McGiffert, Journalism Professor, University of Montana, in
Missoula, Mont. (1993).
22. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-701(6) (1991) (amended 1993 and subsection 6 was
deleted).
23. Associated Press v. State of Montana, 250 Mont. 299, 300, 820 P.2d 421, 421
(1991).
24. Id. at 303, 820 P.2d at 423.
25. 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that a newspaper that published a rape victim's name
in a police blotter roundup could not be punished under FLORIDA STAT. § 794.03 (1987)
which made it unlawful to "print, publish or broadcast ... in any instrument of mass com-
munication" the name of the victim of a sexual offense).
26. 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that a state could not punish a television station for
broadcasting the name of a woman who was raped and murdered when the information
came from a document introduced in court and thus was part of the public record).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (providing for civil penalties against any "person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation ... of any State... subjects.., any citizen
... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws").
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988) (providing penalties for conspiracies to deprive "either
directly or indirectly, any person . . . of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privi-
leges and immunities under the laws").
29. 747 F. Supp. 1515 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 202 (3d. Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S.Ct. 1171 (1992).
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plaint from a woman who had been beaten by her husband, a po-
lice officer who was also named Officer of the Year by his
department. Husband and wife sued the paper under state inti-
macy and false-light privacy claims and also under Section 1983,
alleging that the media defendants had conspired with the un-
named source to deprive them of their constitutional rights. The
trial court held that the couple's privacy rights could serve as a
basis for a Section 1983 conspiracy claim, but granted the defend-
ants' motion to dismiss because their First Amendment interests
outweighed the plaintiffs' privacy interests.3 0 On appeal, the Third
Circuit affirmed the judgment, but on different grounds, finding
that the couple did not have a constitutionally protected privacy
interest in the information contained in the police report.3 1
Similarly, in Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, the plaintiff,
who had been acquitted in the notorious McMartin Preschool child
molestation case, filed a battery of charges, including a Section
1983 charge, against various government entities as well as against
an ABC reporter.2 She claimed that the defendants had conspired
to deprive her of her rights to due process and privacy by subject-
ing her to and encouraging a groundless prosecution. The district
court dismissed her suit.3 3 The Ninth Circuit reversed, but granted
plaintiff leave to replead her case, using section 1985(3). 3 , Media
groups urged the panel to reconsider its decision, warning that it
"opens the door for a new breed of federal 'conspiracy' claims
against those who report to the public about criminal investiga-
tions and proceedings. '35 The court clarified its ruling but did not
change its mind. 6
Despite such rulings as Cox Broadcasting and Florida Star,
reporters still remain at jeopardy for publishing truthful, private,
confidential information. Last March, Tim Roche, a reporter for
The Stuart (Fla.) News, served eighteen days of a thirty-day jail
sentence for contempt, for refusing to divulge the source of a
leaked confidential order terminating a woman's parental rights.
The reporter claimed that he was really being punished for pub-
lishing the truthful information, in violation of Florida Star. The
state appellate court found that the state interest in protecting the
30. Id. at 1527-34.
31. Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1171 (1992).
32. 957 F.2d 652, 653 (9th Cir. 1992).
33. Id. at 654.
34. Id. at 655.
35. 3 COMM. L. 1992, 238 (Practising L. Inst. 1992).
36. Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1992).
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privacy rights of children outweighed any First Amendment inter-
ests, and higher courts refused to disturb the ruling.3 7
All this public concern has prompted much navel-pondering
and scalp-scratching by journalists. Some editors are clearly wor-
ried. A poll taken by the Society of Professional Journalists in 1990
found eighty-four percent of editors who responded said their or-
ganizations were "concerned or very concerned about privacy."3
Forced to respond to changing times and changing attitudes,
many print and electronic media no longer publish or broadcast
addresses where crimes occurred, nor do they insist on identifying
all crime victims. A 1985 survey of editors showed that more than
half had decided to use fewer personal details in identifying crime
victims.3
Despite such concerns, the New York Times printed the name
of William Kennedy Smith's alleged rape victim. 0 And Geneva
Overholser, the Des Moines Register editor, says:
What [newspapers] should be about is wide open and boisterous,
unleashed and rambunctious, story-telling, mirror-holding, fact-
imparting and truth-telling. That's our history, which we should
embrace with gusto ....
Do I approve of all this gossip? It's not up to me to embrace it, to
approve it or to reject it. It's up to me to acknowledge it and, yes,
to publish it. This, for heaven's sake, is human nature.
Editors are the last people in the world who should decide that
folks are just not up to making wise decisions if we give them
some piece of information that we, personally, want to assure ev-
eryone we simply can't stand. I'm willing to bet that part of why
[newspapers have] become less read is because we've become less
gossipy, not more.
We should think hard about whom we are protecting from what.
Too often, the result is a public "protected" from knowing some-
thing they ought to know.
How prissy we are, safeguarding the public standards.4'
37. Roche v. Florida, 589 So. 2d 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 599 So.
2d 1279 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1027 (1993).
38. Hartman, supra note 7, at 7.
39. Hartman, supra note 7, at 4.
40. Fox Butterfield, Leap up Social Ladder for Woman in Rape Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 1991, at A10.
41. Geneva Overholser, Toward Journalism's New Age of Hope, address at University
of California, Riverside, (Feb. 6, 1992), in The Press-Enterprise Lecture Series, No. 27 3-13.
1994]
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In light of the debate over the news media's perceived trans-
gressions of privacy, let us look at some contemporary media posi-
tions on privacy that indicate an ambivalent, and sometimes even
hypocritical, attitude:
• The news media back the broadest possible access to government
information, rebuffing governmental assertions of individual or in-
stitutional privacy, yet react indignantly when reporters' or edi-
tors' own privacy is invaded, whether it be in civil discovery of edi-
torial decision-making and mental processes4 or in newsroom
searches.43
• The news media press for the broadest possible interpretation of
the right to publish truthful information, such as identifying inno-
cent victims of violent crimes, 44 yet criticize government and busi-
ness for collecting and trading in confidential information about
others.
• The news media have termed the confidentiality of news sources
vital to the free flow of information, 5 yet some journalists, and
many prominent news media organizations in their support, have
employed the very same value to justify their willingness to aban-
don pledges of confidentiality. 46 As Justice Yetka of the Minnesota
Supreme Court noted caustically in a dissent, the first time his
court dealt with the case of Cohen v. Cowles Media,
It is unconscionable to allow the press, on the one hand, to hide
behind the shield of confidentiality when it does not want to re-
veal the source of its information; yet, on the other hand, to vio-
late confidentiality agreements with impunity when it decides
that disclosing the source will help make its story more sensa-
tional and profitable. During the Watergate crisis, the press pub-
lished many pious editorials urging that the laws be enforced
equally against everyone, even the President of the United States.
42. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). After the initial outcry about
Herbert, news media concern about getting its collective brains picked seems to have
dropped off sharply, leading to further inconsistency, noted Professor Gilbert Cranberg. The
news media, which so zealously protected the sanctity of newsrooms, "fell virtually silent
about the wholesale looting of its newsrooms" via the civil discovery process. GILBERT CRAN-
SBERG, MALICE IN WONDERLAND: INTRUSION IN THE NEWSROOM 18 (1992). The root of the
media's Herbert problem, Cranberg theorizes, is in New York Times v. Sullivan's recogni-
tion of fault as an element of libel. Fault has to be proven, and Herbert gave the courts a
potent weapon for doing so. Id. at 12.
43. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
44. See Florida Star v. B.J. F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978);
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 429 U.S. 967 (1976); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
45. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
46. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
[Vol. 55
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Nevertheless, the press now argues that the law should not apply
to them because they alone are entitled to make "editorial deci-
sions" as to what the public should read, see, or hear and whether
the source of that information should be disclosed.41
* The press condemns government for an obsession with secrecy,
yet few journalists would ever tolerate a government that bared
information such as tax returns-unless they happen to be Richard
Nixon's, 48 or health information-unless it is that of a high public
official.
- Journalists decry attempts to limit their right to publish intensely
private information, 49 yet approve censorship of youthful journal-
ists' far feebler incursions into personal realms.50
* The same individuals who press for maximum disclosure of gov-
ernment information will not reveal their own hefty speaking fees,
their six- or seven-figure salaries or their close web of ties to Wash-
ington sources. We are talking $250,000 to $300,000 in fees for Pat
Buchanan and twice that or more for George Will, and more than a
million dollars in ABC compensation for Sam Donaldson, who told
Newsweek senior editor Jonathan Alter that disclosing his income
would hurt his credibility as "the guy in the trenchcoat. ' ' 51 "For
some reason," notes journalist Michael Willrich, "journalists accept
the idea that they are the kind of people insulated from money's
subtle influences even though they wouldn't buy that line from,
say, the president of the United States."52
- When it comes to pocketbook interests, freedom of information
can conveniently be forgotten. After winning access to transcripts
of jailhouse conversations between former Panamanian dictator
Manuel Noriega and his lawyers,53 (indeed after having broadcast
47. 457 N.W.2d 199, 206 (Minn. 1990) (Yetka, J., dissenting). Cohen involved the
breach of an oral pledge of confidentiality to a political aide, whose name was published to
highlight an 11th-hour campaign tactic that newspaper editors found newsworthy enough to
override their own reporter's pledge of confidentiality. The Supreme Court held for Cohen
under a theory of promissory estoppel. See Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2520.
48. Jack White of the Providence (R.I.) Journal- Bullitin won the Pulitzer Prize in
1974 for articles about Nixon's tax returns. See also comments by Floyd Abrams in Privacy,
Government and the Media, Part II, CENTER MAG., Nov./Dec. 1982, at 40, 61.
49. See supra note 44.
50. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (allowing high school
administrators to censor school-sponsored publications). Editorial reaction to Hazelwood
was overwhelmingly favorable.
51. Michael Willrich, Renting the Fourth Estate, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1990, at 13,
23.
52. Id. at 16.
53. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd 917 F.2d 1543
(11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Cable News Network, Inc. v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976 (1990).
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portions of those tapes 4 despite having been subjected to a prior
restraint) 55 CNN turned around and opposed other news media
who were attempting to gain access to those transcripts, on the
grounds that they had a proprietary interest in them. 6
- The news media oppose massive data collection and distribution
by government and industry, yet are blind to the possibility, re-
mote as it may seem, that their own information collection could
have anything but benign purposes. Most journalists would en-
dorse the concept that the core danger with personal information
is that it might fall into the wrong hands or be used for a purpose
to which individuals did not agree. As James Rule, a privacy expert
at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, put it, "In
extremis, the sense that nearly any personal information about
one's self might be recorded somewhere, and subjected to un-
friendly use, chills all sorts of desirable public participation. A vig-
orous public life demands conditions in which the boundaries be-
tween public and private information are clearly understood and
conscientiously respected. 57
In an era when huge communications giants are merging to
form colossal communications giants, such as the recent $9.7 bil-
lion merger of Viacom and Paramount Communications, the pro-
position that the news media would never mishandle private infor-
mation is surely worth reconsidering. Is the historically resonant
watchdog role of the press enough to satisfy all doubts that infor-
mation in the hands of the press will always be used for the public
good?
These inconsistent or ambivalent attitudes by the press about
privacy are, if not explainable, at least understandable, when
viewed through the prism of history. From the earliest days, Amer-
ican journalists have not placed individual privacy among their
greatest concerns. Those who believe in the "good old days" are
kidding themselves.
Colonial newspapers were spirited, robust, highly opinionated,
and unapologetically biased. Benjamin Franklin Bache, the grand-
son of Benjamin Franklin, took on the revered George Washington
in his broadsheet Aurora, calling the national hero "an anemic imi-
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. Using CNN's own access arguments, that the content of the jailhouse record-
ings was important in determining the extent to which Noriega's fair trial rights may have
been jeopardized by government conduct, the court opened the transcripts to the public. Id.
at 1044-45.
57. James Rule, Where Does It End? The Public Invasion of Privacy, COMMONWEAL,
Feb. 14, 1992, at 16.
218 [Vol. 55
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tation of the English kings" and commenting that "[ijf ever a na-
tion was debauched by a man, the American nation has been de-
bauched by Washington." An enraged mob beat the impertinent
Bache senseless and he died soon afterward in a yellow fever
epidemic.5 8
Despite Thomas Jefferson's support for the First Amendment,
and his oft-quoted remark "were it left to me to decide whether we
should have a government without newspapers or newspapers
without government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the
latter,"59 Jefferson was irked enough by the press to devote a major
portion of his second inaugural address in 1804 to the subject:
[Tihe artillery of the press has been levelled against us, charged
with whatsoever its licentiousness could devise or dare. These
abuses of an institution so important to freedom, and science are
deeply to be regretted, inasmuch as they tend to lessen its
usefulness.60
Alexis de Tocqueville, the 19th century French chronicler of
American mores, observed that:
The characteristics of the American journalist consist in an open
and coarse appeal to the passions of his readers; he abandons
principles to assail the characters of individuals, to track them
into private life and disclose all their weaknesses and vices.6 '
Democracies tend to undervalue the rights of private persons,
De Tocqueville observed: "the consequence is that [such rights] are
often sacrificed without regret and almost always violated without
remorse."6 " But he also recognized the value of the press: "[lit con-
stitutes a singular power, so strangely composed of mingled good
and evil that liberty could not live without it, and public order can
hardly be maintained against it."63
De Tocqueville came to America during the administration of
Andrew Jackson, and his impressions were formed by a highly par-
tisan and rambunctious press. Anti-Jackson newspapers, for exam-
ple, printed charges in the course of the 1828 campaign, that "Gen-
eral Jackson's mother was a common prostitute and that Jackson
58. JOHN HOHENBERG, FREE PRESS, FREE PEOPLE 65 (1971).
59. Letter to Colonel Edward Carrington, Jan. 16, 1787.
60. President Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1804).
61. I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 194 (Henry Reeve, trans., P.
Bradley ed., 1956).
62. II ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 345 (Henry Reeve, tran., P.
Bradley ed., 1960).
63. I DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 61, at 191.
1994]
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was the result of her marriage to a mulatto man."64
Jackson's newspapers were hardly above the fray: They re-
ported that arch-rival John Quincy Adams had, among other
things, slept with his wife before marrying her65 and warned that
"his immoral practices will redound to his shame and confusion
. . . .[T]he hour of retribution approaches, and he will be obliged
to .. .end his days in ... retirement, where he may curse his
madness at his leisure .... "
The press had hardly been tamed when Abraham Lincoln
campaigned for the presidency; his private life, too, was fair game
for a gamey press. Lincoln often expressed his bitterness with hu-
mor. When his Secretary of War once remarked that "the press is
hardly reliable," Lincoln shot back: "Oh, yes they are. They lie.
And then they re-lie. So they are nothing if not re-lie-able. '67
During Grover Cleveland's campaign for the presidency in
1884, the Buffalo Evening Telegraph charged Cleveland with fa-
thering an illegitimate son.6 8 Worse, when President Cleveland was
married two years later, reporters followed the honeymooners to
Deer Park, Maryland, and staked out the couple all night. A Wash-
ington paper reported:
Among the objects which met [Cleveland's] astounded gaze was a
small pavilion . . . and in and around [it] lounged the flower of
Washington journalism, somewhat battered by lack of sleep and
midnight wrestle with county telegraph operators, but still exper-
iencing a lively interest in the Chief Executive.69
A few months later, in an address at Harvard University, he
denounced "the silly, mean and cowardly lies that every day are
found in the columns of certain newspapers which violate every
instinct of American manliness, and in ghoulish glee desecrate
every sacred relation of private life."'7 0
It is quite possible that two Boston lawyers were in the audi-
ence. Certainly, President Cleveland's annoyance must have rever-
berated with Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, for Boston news-
papers' breathless tales of the private lives of Back Bay society,
including Warren's own family, propelled the two men to postulate
64. Todd Gitlin, Media Lemmings Run Amok!, WASH. JOURNALISM REV., Apr. 1992, at
28, 32 (emphasis omitted).
65. Id.
66. I DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 61, at 190 (quoting VINCENNES GAZETTE).
67. GORE VIDAL, LINCOLN: A NOVEL 198-99 (1984).
68. A Terrible Tale, BUFFALO EVENING TELEGRAPH, July 21, 1884.
69. FRANK L. MOTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM: A HISTORY: 1690-1950, 510-11 (1950).
70. Id. at 511.
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the legal right to privacy." In their famous Harvard Law Review
article in 1890, Warren and Brandeis excoriated the press:
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have in-
vaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life .... The
press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the
idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued
with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the
details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of
the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is
filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion
upon the domestic circle.7 2
The spirit of American journalism is neatly captured in Henry
James' The Reverberator, an 1888 novel whose protagonist is a
young journalist, George Flack. He enthuses:
The society news of every quarter of the globe . . . served up at
every breakfast table in the United States-that's what the
American people want .... I'm going for the secrets ... what the
people want is just what isn't told, and I'm going to tell it. That's
about played out, anyway, the idea of sticking up a sign of 'pri-
vate' and thinking you can keep the place to yourself. You can't
do it-you can't keep out the light of the Press.7 3
What James was gently lampooning, and what Warren and
Brandeis were reacting to, the turn-of-the-century excesses of
American journalism in the sex, scandal, and bloody murder era of
"yellow journalism," were made all the more widespread by tre-
mendous increases in newspaper and magazine circulation. Daily
newspaper circulation probably doubled in the decade from 1892
to 1902, and the combined circulation of the morning and evening
editions of the New York World, the largest American newspaper
of the time, topped one million. Some newspapers sold for a
penny; some illustrated monthly magazines for a dime. 5
Such increases were made possible by major technological ad-
71. But it is probably not the case, as speculated by Dean William Prosser in his own
famous 1960 law review article categorizing privacy torts, (Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383
(1960)), that Warren's ire was fueled by media publicity of his own daughter's wedding, as
she could not have been more than seven years old. See James Barron, Warren and Bran-
deis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation,
13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 898 (1979).
72. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195-96 (1890).
73. HENRY JAMES, THE REVERBERATOR, 67-68 (1888).
74. Morr, supra note 69, at 546-47.
75. MoTT, supra note 69, at 590.
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vances, the "recent inventions" to which Warren and Brandeis re-
ferred .7 Typewriters were introduced into the newsroom in 1876,
telephones in the early 1880s, and news photography and half-
tones in 1897.11 Ottmar Mergenthaler's linotype, which became
available in 1886, as well as large, high-speed presses, and the com-
mon availability of wood pulp for newsprint, all helped revolution-
ize and further democratize the daily press.
78
Ironically, yellow journalism's decline can be tied to the New
York Journal's treatment of another president. In 1901, shortly af-
ter Governor Goebel of Kentucky had been assassinated, the
Hearst newspaper ran this incredible quatrain by Ambrose Bierce:
The bullet that Pierced Goebel's breast
Can not be found in all the West;
Good reason, it is speeding here
To stretch McKinley on his bier.7 9
These sentiments were recalled seven months later when the
anarchist Leo Czolgosz shot and killed McKinley. Hearst was
hanged in effigy and President Theodore Roosevelt, in his first ad-
dress to Congress, theorized that Czolgosz had probably been in-
spired by "reckless utterances of those who, on the stump and in
the public press, appeal to dark and evil spirits." 80 Roosevelt's ire
at the press later spurred him to instigate a libel case in 1913
against the editor of the Iron Ore, a weekly paper in Ishpeming,
Michigan, whose editor had had the temerity to state that during
Roosevelt's "bull moose" campaign in 1912 he habitually became
intoxicated. 1 Roosevelt paraded to the witness stand a procession
of famous men who swore to his temperance. The publisher apolo-
gized; the judge directed a verdict for Roosevelt for six cents.2
No brief survey of scandal and the American press can be
complete without mention of The Saturday Press, published in the
late 1920s and early 1930s in St. Paul, Minnesota, by Howard
Guilford and Jay Near, and its cousin, The Duluth Rip-Saw,
whose prosecution as a public nuisance under the so-called Gag
Law precipitated the seminal prior restraint case, Near v. Minne-
sota. 3 During Prohibition, bootleggers, shielded by crooked politi-
76. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 72, at 195.
77. See Morr, supra note 69, at 498-501.
78. MoTT, supra note 69, at 500-01.
79. MoTT, supra note 69, at 541 (quoting New York Journal, Feb. 4, 1901).
80. MoTT, supra note 69, at 541.
81. MoTr, supra note 69, at 608.
82. MoTT, supra note 69, at 608.
83. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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cians, were flooding the Twin Cities with "hooch." "These miscre-
ant purveyors of scandal" accused the Minneapolis police chief of
failing to pursue a "Jewish gangster" who reputedly controlled
gambling, bootlegging and racketeering in the city. Although Near
and Guilford may have abused the liberty of the press, "[it] does
not make any the less necessary the immunity of the press from
previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct," wrote Chief
Justice Hughes for the majority, including Justice Brandeis.,"
In more recent history, in post-World War II America, a press
far less fractious and much more loyal to the administration looked
the other way no matter what Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman,
Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson were up
to. The same hands-off treatment applied to Congressmen. The
press knew for fifteen years that Wilbur Mills was a public drunk,
but it took Fanne Foxe's little dip in the Tiday Basin on October
8, 1974, to trigger what was then a massive wave of articles focus-
ing on Mills' alcoholism, his initial denial of the problem, and his
eventual fall into disgrace. 5
What little bit of Ronald Reagan's teflon rubbed off on George
Bush worked well enough to cover at least some private parts of
his life. Now that we again have a president whose age is close to
the median age of most working journalists, the gloves aTe off.86
If the history of American journalism reflects a certain consis-
tency in the news media's attitude about (other people's) privacy,
so too does the legal position of the press, at least as reflected in
cases pitting freedom of the press against a right of privacy. The
press position has been a fairly consistent one, grounded in the
free flow of information and the democratic principles that under-
lie the First Amendment. Where the public interest is recognized,
either by the news media or the court, the press usually prevails.
For example, the quartet of court access cases decided by the
Burger Court in the 1980s8 7 are a clear statement of law and policy
84. Id. at 720.
85. The NEw YORK TIMES indexes for 1974 and 1975 cite nearly 50 articles in the
TIMES related to the incident, Mills' alcoholism, his reelection, and subsequent disgrace fol-
lowing his refusal to cut ties with the stripper.
86. See, e.g., Christopher Georges, Bad News Bearers, WASH. MONTHLY, July-Aug.
1993, at 28; Jonathan Alter, The Jurassic Park Press, NEWSWEEK, June 28, 1993, at 37;
Mickey Kaus, Tribal Hatred, NEW REPUBLIC, June 21, 1993, at 4; Stanley W. Cloud, Clinton
vs. the Press, TIME, June 7, 1993, at 27; Donald Baer, Is the Press Fair to Bill Clinton?, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 6, 1992, at 33.
87. Press-Enterprise v. Riverside County Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1986)
(holding that public and press have right of access to preliminary proccedings in criminal
cases); Press-Enterprise v. Riverside County Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510-11 (1984)
(holding that a court cannot seal transcript of voir dire proceedings); Globe Newspaper v.
1994]
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affirming the public's right to attend proceedings in the criminal
courts. In Richmond Newspapers, Chief Justice Burger focused on
the long Anglo-American tradition of open courts, stemming from
before the Norman Conquest.8 A more compelling case for access
was made by Justice Brennan's concurring opinion (adopted by
Burger in the Press-Enterprise cases), examining the First Amend-
ment's "structural role ... in securing and fostering our republican
system of self-government."8 9
Brennan used at least four policy arguments connected to the
free flow of information to conclude that "public access is an indis-
pensable element of the trial process itself."90 First is informed de-
bate: "Implicit in this structural role is not only 'the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-
open' (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan) but also the antece-
dent assumption that valuable public debate-as well as other
civic behavior-must be informed." 1 Secondly, argued Brennan,
Open trials assure the public that procedural rights are respected,
and that justice is afforded equally. Closed trials breed suspicion
of prejudice and arbitrariness, which in turn spawns disrespect
for law. Public access is essential, therefore, if trial adjudication is
to achieve the objective of maintaining public confidence in the
administration of justice.2
Moreover, he noted, "public access to trials acts as an important
check, akin in purpose to the other checks and balances that in-
fuse our system of government. '1 3 Finally, Brennan argued, "pub-
licizing trial proceedings aids accurate factfinding." 94
Similar statements reoccur in the other cases in the access
quartet. The result amounts to a two-part test for further court
examination of issues involving access not only to criminal trials
but to governmental proceedings and government information: 1)
whether the proceeding has traditionally been open and 2) whether
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of
the particular process in question. The access quartet has led to a
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-09 (1982) (holding that statutory exclusion of press and
public from trial testimony of minors who are complaining witnesses in sex crimes cases is
unconstitutional); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 (1980) (holding pub-
lic and press cannot be excluded from entire criminal trial).
88. Richmond Newspapers 448 U.S. at 564-73.
89. Id. at 587.
90. Id. at 597.
91. Id. at 587.
92. Id. at 595 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 596 (emphasis added).
94. Id.
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considerable reduction, but hardly a disappearance, of court clo-
sures. 5 The question now is the extent to which the access cases
support public access to civil proceedings and judicial documents.
News media litigants are using Brennan's structural approach as
well as common law and constitutional law arguments for access,
but the question has hardly been decided.96
Free-flow-of-information values also underlie the news media
defense to the tort of publication of private facts, the wrong about
which Warren and Brandeis were most concerned.9 7 In fact, "the
trend in 'modern' jurisprudence," as Justice White pointed out in
his dissent in Florida Star (not a common law invasion-of-privacy
case), "has been to eclipse an individual's right to maintain private
any truthful information that the press wished to publish."'
White also observed:
by holding that protecting a rape victim's right to privacy is not
among those state interests of the highest order, the Court ac-
95. See Dan Paul & Richard J. Ovelman, The Year's Access Developments, 3 COMM.
L. 1992, at 17 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Handbook Series
348, 1992).
96. Id. at 63-115.
97. See Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and
Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703 (1990), who points out that:
Ironically, one of the most scathing attacks on [Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E.2d 442 (1902) (initially refusing to recognize a right
of privacy)] was waged by a member of the press and published in the New York
Times .. .which editorialized:
If there be ... no law now to cover these savage and horrible practices,
practices incompatible with the claims of the community in which they
are allowed to be committed with impunity to be called a civilized com-
munity, then the decent people will say that it is high time that there
were such a law. Id.at 717 n.91 (quoting NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 23,
1902, at A8).
98. 491 U.S. 524, 553 (1989). In Florida Star, a police incident report of a rape, nam-
ing the victim, was made available in the press room of the sheriff's department and was
picked up by a cub reporter. The Star published a police-blotter item on the rape, including
the victim's name (B.J.F.), contrary to its own internal policy to not name victims of sexual
assaults. B.J.F. sued the Star for negligently violating a state statute automatically imposing
criminal liability for news media identification of sexual offense victims. She was awarded
$100,000 in a jury trial. On appeal from an appellate affirmance, the Supreme Court held
that imposing damages on the Star for publishing B.J.F's name violated the First Amend-
ment. The Court held that the state statute failed the constitutional test announced in
.Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 440 U.S. 955 (1979) because it imparts criminal punish-
ment automatically, even to truthful information lawfully obtained, about a matter of public
concern, without any specific determination of whether the prohibition on publication was
justified under the particular circumstances presented. The Florida statute in question, FLA.
STAT. 794.03 (1989), was held to be unconstitutional in 1991 on an appeal by Globe Commu-
•nications after it was charged with violating the law by naming the rape victim in the cele-
brated William Kennedy Smith case. The order was affirmed by the Florida District Court
of Appeals on August 4, 1993, in Florida v. Globe Communications, Inc., 622 So. 2d 1066
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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cepts appellant's invitation to obliterate one of the most notewor-
thy legal inventions of the 20th century: the tort of the publica-
tion of private facts .... If the First Amendment prohibits wholly
private persons ... from recovering for the publication of the fact
that she was raped, I doubt that there remain any "private facts"
which persons may assume will not be published in the newspa-
pers or broadcast on television (footnote omitted).99
White was exaggerating for effect; the tort is still the basis for
numerous lawsuits. But broad recognition of news media defenses
of newsworthiness-and recognition that the press must decide
what is news-has led numerous comme'tators to wonder how
much viability the tort has left.100 As one appellate court recently
noted:
We do not think the Court was being coy in Cox or Florida Star
in declining to declare the tort of publicizing intensely personal
facts totally defunct . . . .The publication of facts in a public
record ... such as the police report in the Florida Star, is not to
be equated to publishing a photo of a couple making love ....
Yet ... the implications of those decision for [this] branch of the
right of privacy ... are profound .... People who do not desire
the limelight and do not deliberately choose a way of life or
course of conduct calculated to thrust them into it nevertheless
have no legal right to extinguish it if the experiences that have
befallen them are newsworthy, even if they would prefer that
those experiences be kept private. 10'
Likewise, what is sometimes referred to as "source privacy" or
reporters' privilege to keep sources confidential, is predicated both
on the need to preserve a free flow of information and on the fear
that government use of information confided to the press will jeop-
ardize the free flow of information. Justice Stewart, in his "major-
ity dissent" in Branzburg v. Hayes,10 said that "[t]he reporter's
constitutional right to a confidential relationship with his source
stems from the broad societal interest in a full and free flow of
99. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 550-51.
100. See Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a
Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291
(1983).
101. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming sum-
mary judgment for defendants in a libel and privacy case against the author, Nicholas
Lemann, and publisher (Knopf) of a 1991 book titled, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT
BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA, brought by two central figures in the
journalistic history).
102. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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information to the public." ' 3 Reasoning that the right to gather
news was a corollary of the right to publish inherent in the First
Amendment, Stewart added that "[t]he right to gather news im-
plies, in turn, a right to a confidential relationship between a re-
porter and his source."104 "Finally, and most important," noted
Stewart, "when governmental officials possess an unchecked [sub-
poena] power to compel newsmen to disclose information received
in confidence, sources will clearly be deterred from giving informa-
tion, and reporters will clearly be deterred from publishing it, be-
cause uncertainty about exercise of the power will lead to 'self-cen-
sorship.' "5 Even though contained in a dissent, Stewart's three-
part test '1 for determining whether a reporter can be compelled to
give testimony carried the day and has been widely adopted by
lower courts.'0 7
The constitutional privilege established in the famous libel
case, New York Times v. Sullivan,'°s and modified in Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch'09 was arguably the most significant press-privacy vic-
tory of all, because it allowed the news media far greater freedom
to write and broadcast stories about the private lives of public
figures by imposing a much higher fault standard of "actual mal-
ice." The Court established the policy that public figures should be
subject to public scrutiny, because of their position as opinion
leaders or as participants in matters of public interest, and because
of their greater access to the press. "[D]ebate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and ...may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at-
tacks on government and public officials," Justice Brennen de-
clared in New York Times."10 Politicians, disciples of Darwinian
principles of survival, have adapted to the new scrutiny and have
developed a new, potentially very effective counter strategy: going
straight to the public via the "new media" and cutting out the
103. Id. at 725.
104. Id. at 728.
105. Id. at 731.
106. . Id. at 743 (the government must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe
that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of
law; (footnote omitted) (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by
alternative means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a com-
pelling and overriding interest in the information).Id.
107. See United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1056 (1981); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966
(1973).
108. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
109. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
110. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
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news media in the middle. What does this have to do with privacy?
Public officials now have the means of instantly countering bad
publicity, in a direct channel to voters, many of whom would just
as soon cut out the media, too-and now possess the means to do
SO.
1 1 1
Jerry Brown's 800 campaign number was the opening blow in
demediating the media; Ross Perot's windy "infomercials" en-
larged the possibilities.11 Clinton adopted the strategy in his cam-
paign's use of talk-show forums and town-hall meetings for direct
communication with voters. How much defter, for example, were
Bill and Hillary Clinton, in their frontal defense on "60 Minutes"
during the 1992 presidential campaign, than was Gary Hart, frozen
in time like a buck in the headlights of our national memory?
President Clinton's administration continues to employ plenty
of direct-communication strategies. Clinton is the first president to
have an e-mail address; all his public statements are put out on
computer data services and the White House is working on facili-
tating two-way communications. Got a gripe? Tap it out on your
PC and zap it to clintonpz@aol.com. By the same token, of course,
journalists' use of computerized access tools, including the In-
ternet, private networks such as CompuServe and America On-
Line, and CD-ROM and on-line data bases such as InfoTrac and
Nexis, have enlarged investigative and data-gathering possibilities.
To be fair, inconsistent and confused attitudes toward privacy
are likely to arise simply because privacy is such an amorphous
concept, covers such an enormous range of human concerns, and
encompasses values that are sure to conflict. Even within tort pri-
vacy, there are seemingly irreconcilable differences. The commer-
111. In the Gulf War, CNN provided as close to an unmediated window on events as
had been seen to date, but the Internet, the global computer network linking perhaps fifteen
million people directly and as many as twenty-five million through private networks, pro-
vided a completely unmediated channel of communication that allowed news of Gulf events
to travel swiftly to many people. As the author of one popular guide to the Internet notes:
Although a bit less glamorous-without the video and the heroic flak-jacketed re-
porters-the Internet hummed with live bulletins during the Gulf War, as it also
did during the Tiananmen Square confrontation, the Soviet coup attempt, the
civic uprising in Thailand, the riots in Los Angeles, and the civil war in what used
to be Yugoslavia....
In the Gulf War news coverage, we were the watchers, dependent on a few men
and women with cameras and a company with the technology to bring those
images home to us. On the Internet, we are the reporters, the viewers, and the
production team.
TRACY LAQUEY WITH JEANNE C. RYDER, THE INTERNET COMPANION, 2-3 (1993).
112. See James M. Perry, Party May Be Over for Democrats, Republicans As Candi-
dates Use 'Teledemocracy,' New Media, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1992, at A16.
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cial appropriation tort is primarily a property interest; at first
glance it seems to resemble false-light invasion of privacy or the
disclosure of private information about the way that lobsters re-
semble tight shoes or Italian men in elevators.11 3 False-light pri-
vacy, much like defamation, depends on a sense of outrage, but
does not require falsity. Intrusion, which requires no publication,
depends entirely on invasion of individual autonomy and thus is
more closely connected to the penumbral privacy found in home
and family decisions. 14 Like the giant fungus recently discovered
in Washington state, privacy underlies a lot of legal acreage. As
Oregon associate justice Hans Linde once said, "give . . . lawyers
• . . a word like privacy to play with, and they will take it anyplace
and do anything with it."115 We live in a country that is constantly
embroiled in disputes labeled "privacy"-yet we live under a Con-
stitution that does not even mention the word.
A frequent source of legal confusion about privacy stems from
the recognition of a right of autonomous privacy. The values inher-
ent in this constitutional right of privacy, derived from the sanc-
tity of the individual and the home, are connected, but not identi-
cal, to tort and access privacy. 16
In Griswold v. Connecticut,'17 the Supreme Court told the
state of Connecticut that it did not have any business criminally
punishing doctors for giving contraceptive advice to married
couples because that intruded into the "sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms.""' Justice Douglas' famous discovery of an unenumer-
ated but "fundamental" right of privacy in the penumbras of the
First," 9 Third,'2 0 Fourth,' 2 ' and Fifth Amendments,' combined
with other justices' simultaneous discovery of privacy in the con-
cept of liberty protected by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth and Fifth Amendments and the Ninth Amendment'
3
113. They all pinch.
114. See infra text accompanying notes 117-29.
115. Hans Linde, The Constitution and Privacy, CENTER MAG., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 46,
49.
116. For commentary attempting to distinguish and classify the various kinds of pri-
vacy, see, e.g., Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 269-81
(1977); Tyler Baker, Note, Roe & Paris, Does Privacy Have a Principle? 26 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1163-66 (1974).
117. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
118. Griswold 381 U.S. at 485.
119. Id. at 483.
120. Id. at 484.
121. Id. at 484-85.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 486, 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring), 502 (White, J., concurring).
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added up to a Supreme Court recognition of a constitutional right
of privacy that really amounts to a right of individual autonomy. 2 "
Subsequent court decisions in this field, most famously in the
Roe v. Wade abortion case, 2 ' extended this autonomous right of
privacy to the right to marry,'26 the right to choose family mem-
bers, 2 7 child-rearing decisions,'28 and education. 2 9 As opposed to
autonomous privacy, grounded in the sanctity of the individual
and his or her home, informational privacy (implicated in most
press-privacy disputes) is grounded in the individual's right not to
have private information evaluated by others without his or her
consent. 130 But courts have not always been intellectually rigorous
in keeping separate the two strands of privacy that may be in-
volved.13 For example, in Frisby v. Schultz,"2 upholding a general
residential anti-picketing law, the Supreme Court bought the au-
tonomy value of the individual's right to privacy in the home, even
though the First Amendment values of political speech were
strongly implicated in the picketing. By contrast, in Florida Star,
the Court held that free-flow-of-information values outweighed in-
formational privacy claims, even though core First Amendment
values were less strongly involved in the identification of a rape
victim. 33
Nor have legislatures kept the two privacy concepts straight.
For example, the true privacy interest protected in the Privacy
Protection Act of 1980,"" limiting newsroom searches, is not imme-
diately obvious. The stated purpose of the act is "[t]o limit govern-
mental search and seizure of documentary materials possessed by
persons." 65 The strongest interest of the news media seems to be
in not being a tool of law enforcement, an objection grounded in
the watchdog role of a free press that is institutionally antagonistic
to, or at least skeptical of, government. A related interest would be
124. See Thomas Huff, Thinking Clearly About Privacy, 55 WASH. L. REV. 777, 785-86
(1980); see also G. Sidney Buchanan, The Right of Privacy: Past, Present and Future, 16
OHIo N.U. L. REV. 403, 404 (1989).
125. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
126. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
127. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
128. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
129. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
130. See Huff, supra note 124, at 780-82.
131. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479; Loving, 388 U.S. at 1; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374.
132. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
133. 491 U.S. 524 (1989). For a full analysis, see Russell D. Workman, Balancing the
Right to Privacy and the First Amendment, 29 Hous. L. REV. 1059 (1992).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1988).
135. 42 U.S.C. 2000aa to -12 (1988).
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press liberty and freedom from governmental interference in new-
sgathering. Another interest arises from the forced release of infor-
mation obtained under a promise of confidentiality, possibly lead-
ing to a drying-up of sources and a diminishing of the flow of
information. Any true privacy interest, perhaps the vicarious con-
cern for governmental misuse of privately collected information,
seems an inferior concern.
The area of citizen or consumer privacy, like Fourth Amend-
ment privacy, derives its philosophical underpinnings from both
privacy bases, informational and autonomous privacy. The news
media has often warned of the awesome proliferation of data bases
of individual information traded, sold, and swapped by govern-
ment and business, accessed with ease through personal com-
puters. 136 Is that a concern based on informational privacy, the
same privacy interest that underlies the arguments of plaintiffs in
privacy tort cases, or is it based on autonomous privacy?
On average, according to privacy expert David Linowes, there
are at least fifteen federal agency files on every man, woman and
child in America and most likely an equal number in the hands of
private institutions such as credit bureaus and insurance
companies.137
Often, the news media is only vicariously involved in citizen or
consumer privacy. But at times, its concern is more immediate.
When Procter and Gamble wanted to discover the source of an em-
barrassing leak about company insiders, used as the basis for a
story in the Wall Street Journal, it subpoenaed tens of millions of
telephone call records from two Baby Bells to identify "all 513 area
code numbers that dialed the home or office phone number" of the
reporter who wrote the story. The Journal argued that this sweep-
ing data collection had a chilling effect on its ability to gather news
and on the free flow of information.138
Law professor Arthur Miller speaks eloquently of the danger
of our transmogrification into a dossier democracy, if such an oxy-
moron can exist. He warns of "a society in which there are no time,
space, or quantitative limits on the movement, transfer, and ma-
nipulation of information.""13 Realization that large and powerful
136. Robert Ellis Smith, Publisher, PRIVACY J., Speech at the University of Montana
Law School (Apr. 29, 1993).
137. David F. Linowes, Privacy in America Update, the Individual's Right to Legal
Action, address at the National Conference of State Legislatures (Nov. 9, 1990), in VITAL
SPEECHES OF THE DAY 207, 207 (1991).
138. Rule, supra, note 57, at 14.
139. Arthur R. Miller, The Right to Be Let Atone, CENTER MAG., Sept.-Oct. 1982, at
33, 33.
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organizations in our society are using data to make decisions about
us "creates enormous anxiety as to the accuracy of the informa-
tion, the currency of the information, the relevance of the informa-
tion, and the wisdom of the middle-level bureaucrats who manipu-
late and make decisions based on the information," he notes." °
In fact, some commentators argue, protecting against massive
intrusion into autonomous privacy is where privacy law ought to be
directed. "Many of the most troubling privacy questions today
arise not from the media's wide dissemination of private informa-
tion, but from the rise of technology that allows for the exchange
of computerized information . . . ." says Richard F. Hixson."' And
Diane Zimmerman suggests that:
[p]rivacy law might be more just and effective if it were to focus
on identifying (preferably by statute) those exchanges of informa-
tion that warrant protection at their point of origin, rather than
continuing its current, capricious course of imposing liability only
if the material is ultimately disseminated to the public at large.' 2
Judges' personal attitudes about privacy are no less inconsis-
tent. The Supreme Court's broadly worded string of opinions on
access to courts 4" was based not only on historical access but on
fundamental principles underlying the First Amendment, such as
citizen participation in government and citizens' ability to check
the power of government through observation of public bodies at
work. Yet that civics lesson hardly seems to have swayed Supreme
Court prohibition of cameras in the high court.
In addition, further confusion about privacy is likely to arise
among many citizens because they are at least as likely, if not more
likely, to see the moral and ethical implications of an invasion of
privacy by the news media than they are to appreciate the finer
legal niceties. Unfortunately, the legal pressures on the media are
so enormous that issues which should be decided on ethical
grounds often get shoehorned into an acceptable legal pigeonhole
by lawyers and judges-definers and limiters by trade. It is just as
likely that the inherent caution of the legal review process also
kills a lot of perfectly good stories with no troublesome moral or
ethical dimensions.
Take the case of Clarence Arrington, the middle-class black
140. Id.; see also Arthur R. Miller, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS
AND DOSSIERS (1971); The Dossier Society, 1971 U. ILL. L. F. 154 (1971).
141. RICHARD F. HIXSON, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 182
(1987).
142. See Zimmerman, supra note 100, at 362-63.
143. See Zimmerman, supra note 100, at 362-63.
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who sued the New York Times unsuccessfully for invasion of pri-
vacy for using his photo for the cover shot for a magazine story
about how middle-class blacks ignore their less-fortunate breth-
ren.1 44 How just is it to the average person that Arrington's recov-
ery-or lack thereof-was determined more by jurisdiction (New
York's very restrictive privacy law) than by perhaps any other fac-
tor? What about Oliver Sipple, the gay man in San Francisco who
saved the life of President Ford and was then "outed" by colum-
nist Herb Caen-and lost his privacy case, too, ' 45 because his sex-
ual orientation was deemed "newsworthy"? Or Florida Star v.
B.J.F.,146 in which a rape victim named in a newspaper story failed
to recover for invasion of privacy? And the woman with Elephant
Man disease, cruelly lampooned by two radio disk jockeys, would
hardly agree that their thoughtless and hurtful comments did not
amount to conduct "highly offensive to a reasonable person. 11
47
Each of these opinions has legal reasons for holding for the media,
but also suggest very strongly that for the average person, concerns
of fairness, responsibility and outrage at invasion of privacy weigh
just as heavily, or more so, than the norm of the free flow of infor-
mation and freedom of the press.
On the other hand, there is probably considerable truth to the
observation by historian and sociologist Hannah Arendt that ob-
session with privacy can be unhealthy. As Arendt observed, the
German bourgeoisie during the Nazi period were so obsessed by
their right to privacy, to be let alone, that they were most vulnera-
ble to a totalitarian movement. "Nothing proved easier to destroy
than the privacy and private morality of people who thought of
nothing but safeguarding their private lives. 148 Obsession with
privacy in the legal arena can also be unhealthy when, as Huff
points out, it is extended to protecting one's image by "petty
claims to dignitary harms. 149 With modern information
technology,
the privacy norm plays an important and essential role in helping
us control our lives by restricting how and when we might be sub-
144. Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319 (N.Y. 1982) cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1146 (1993).
145. Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
146. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
147. Kolengas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 578 N.E.2d 299 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) appeal
allowed, 587 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. 1992). On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court found a cause of
action for false-light privacy as well as for defamation. Kolengas v. Heftel Broadcasting
Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 207-11 (Ill. 1992).
148. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 331 (1951).
149. Huff, supra note 124, at 783.
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ject to evaluation. What is troublesome is that it can also be mis-
used to try to protect 'images,' which is dishonest and destructive
of the very social relations privacy helps protect."' 50
In summary, conflicting attitudes and even bald inconsisten-
cies on the issue of privacy are bound to re-occur because privacy
is so amorphous, all-encompassing and situational. Privacy has al-
ways played a central role in the affairs of mankind and probably
always will. The news media cannot thrive if they don't pay atten-
tion to the concerns of the readers and viewers and evolve in step
with the times. These days, that means paying more attention to
privacy concerns. But neither can the news media survive if they
are not vigorous advocates of openness and citizen participation.
To yield too much to privacy concerns would be to turn one's back
on a rich tradition and a lot of hard-won victories in the courts and
legislatures. In the long run, the relationship of the news media to
privacy may change, but it will still remain a complex one, even a
hypocritical one at times. As Mark Twain once said, "History may
not repeat, but it sure rhymes."
150. Huff, supra note 124, at 783.
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